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Using 5-year balanced household panel data, this paper shows that the inequality of per 
capita income in Korea aggravated during the financial crisis in 1998. The decomposition analysis 
of income inequality by factor component shows that the dominant positive effect on the income 
inequality is by the asset income. Next is the wage income, followed by the other income. 
Furthermore, this paper shows that social safety net programs were not yet in place during the 
initial period of the crisis. Public transfers were not effective social safety net devices and did not 
contribute in decreasing income inequality. Private transfers, on the other hand, were effective 
devices and narrowed the disparity in household income. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Triggered by the Asian financial crisis, Korea suffered from economic imbalances. 
With the onset of the crisis, real GDP contracted by 6.7 percent in 1998 and unemployment 
rate jumped from 2.6 percent in 1997 to 6.8 percent and inflation rose to 7.5 percent. As a 
social impact, poverty incidence rose. The 8.6 percent of poor urban households jumped to 
19 percent, back to the level of 1993 (Kakwani (2000), World Bank (2000)). 
It is often asked whether the burden of the economic crisis is being equally distributed 
among the rich and the poor. One would expect income inequality to aggravate during 
recessive times since it is plausible that people belonging to high-income group have more 
ways to protect their income than people belonging to low-income group, and since the effect 
on wage income that is basically the only resource of the poor, will be more serious. On the 
other hand, one would expect social safety net devices of the government like public 
transfers and private transfers to protect the income of people belonging to low-income 
group would contribute to improve income inequality. In Korea, for instance, employment 
insurance and national pension, which constitute the public transfers, were introduced in 
order to reduce income inequality. 
This paper examines the impact of the crisis on income distribution by exploring the 
change in income sources and the role of private and public transfers as social safety net 
devices. This  paper uses per capita household income rather than household income in order 
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to control the effects of different household sizes. Thus, we are considering the household as 
a unit characterized by a flow of income transfers.  
Using 5-year balanced panel data of the Korea Household Panel Survey (KHPS), this 
paper shows that per capita income inequality increased during the crisis. The finding is 
consistent with that of Cheong (2001) using the Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
(HIES) data. Through inequality decomposition by factor component, it is shown that the 
dominant positive effect on the income inequality is by the asset income. Next is the wage 
income, followed by the other income. In addition, this paper shows that public transfers as 
the main social safety nets did not play a significant role in reducing per capita income 
inequality. This is because public transfers were consisted predominantly of pension and not 
of public assistance and because social safety net programs were not yet in place during the 
initial period of the crisis. Private transfers, on the other hand, played a positive role in 
reducing income inequality.  
The results of the paper suggest important policy implications. First, in order to 
improve income inequality, government transfer policies should be well targeted to the poor. 
Second, even if public transfers are well targeted to the poor, public transfer programs need 
to be carefully designed to prevent crowding-out effect of the more prevalent private 
transfers because there is a strong crowding-out relation between private and public transfers 
in Korea (Jimenez, Kang and Sawada (2001)). 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the data and evolution 
of income inequality. Section III explores the impact of income components on income 
distribution. Section IV discusses the role of public and private transfers as social safety net 
devices, and Section V concludes. 
 
II. Evolution of Income Distribution 
 
1. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The Korea Household Panel Survey (KHPS) data has a rectangular form, following the 
Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) in the US. There are no replacements of 
households, but household split-offs due to marriage or other reasons are included. The 
survey was conducted in all Korean prefectures except Jeju-do through stratified random 
sampling by street blocks: eight and seven households from each street block are randomly 
selected in large and small cities, respectively. The data consists of multi-purpose surveys in 
household and individual modules. This study excludes data of the first and second waves 
because definition of some variables and the period covered are not comparable with those in 
the later waves. Thus, this study examines periods from 1995 to 1998, inclusive of the initial 
period of the Asian financial crisis. Table 1 summarizes the number of households and the 
period covered by the KHPS data.1 
 
1. The data are compared with the survey data of the HIES conducted by the Korea National Statistical Office which 
has been extensively used in the estimation of income and expenditure inequality indices (Kakwani (2000), 
Cheong (2001)). The HIES data is a repeated cross -section data and covers households residing only in 72 cities, 
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Some basic economic variables for Korea are presented in Table 2 for years 1994-1998. 
Between 1994 and 1997, annual average growth rate of GDP was 7.3 percent; unemployment 
and inflation rates were hovering around 2 and 4.5 percent, respectively. The onset of the 
financial crisis, however, caused GDP growth rate to fall from 5.0 percent in 1997 to －6.7 
percent in 1998, and unemployment and inflation rate to collapse to 6.8 percent and 7.5 
percent, respectively, in 1998. 
 
Table 1  The KHPS Data 
 Period Covered 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
1993 Jan. 92 - Dec. 92 4547 3609 3045 2712 2571 2266 
1994 Apr. 93 - Mar. 94  16 13 11 9 7 
1995 Aug. 94 - Jul. 95   50 41 39 30 
1996 Aug. 95 - Jul. 96    69 55 39 
1997 Aug. 96 - Jul. 97     50 46 
1998 Aug. 97 - Jul. 98      80 
Drop-outs    938 564 333 141 305 
New Entry 
(Split-offs) 
  
16 63 121 153 202 
Drop-out rate (%)   20.6 15.6 10.9 5.2 11.9 
Total  4547 3625 3108 2833 2724 2468 
 
Table 2  Basic Indices of Korean Economy 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
GDP Growth Rate 8.3 8.9 6.8 5.0 －6.7 
Unemployment Rate 2.4 2.0 2.0 2.6 6.8 
CPI (1995=100) 95.7 100 104.9 109.6 117.8 
Inflation (CPI) 6.2 4.5 4.9 4.5 7.5 
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, The Bank of Korea (2001). 
 
Table 3 gives the definition of income by factor component while Table 4 reports the 
descriptive statistics of per capita income by its component of the balanced panel 
households.2 All variables are expressed in 10 thousand Korean won throughout the paper. 
The number of balanced households in every year is 1,978. All income categories - wage, 
asset, transfers and other income - are in terms of per capita household at constant 1995 
prices. The subcategories of transfers - public and private - are shown as well. 
 
 
excluding 1) farmers, 2) fishermen, 3) single and 4) foreign households. And this survey does not provide 
information on incomes of unemployed and self-employed household heads. 
2. See Goh, Kang and Sawada (2001) for descriptive statistics of household characteristics, expenditure, asset and 
debt variables. 
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Table 3  Definition of Income Variables 
Wage Income salaried workers, entrepreneurs, 
 temporary/part-time workers, and side business workers 
Asset Income interest or dividend income from saving/bond/shares, 
 income from leasing land, house, or building and 
 through selling land, house, or building 
Transfers  
Public national, private schools/civil servant/military, and 
 veterans’ pension, support from government or 
 social organization, and employment insurance 
Private support from family or relatives 
Other Income Time deposit, insurance payments received, t ime deposit 
 insurance received, selling securities, selling real estates, 
 loan repayments, lottery payment received, and others 
 
Table 4  Descriptive Statistics of Per Capita Income Components 
Per Capita 
Income 
1995 1996 1997 1998 
% change 
95/97 
% change 
97/98 
Total Income 664.75 761.82 776.30 591.55 8.4 －23.8 
 (100) (100) (100) (100)   
Wage Income 483.69 534.65 541.05 408.93 5.9 －24.4 
 (72.8) (70.2) (69.7) (69.1)   
Asset Income 118.54 151.02 146.69 84.75 11.9 －42.2 
 (17.8) (19.8) (18.9) (14.3)   
Transfer Income 20.70 25.79 29.50 29.45 21.3 －0.2 
 (3.1) (3.4) (3.8) (5.0)   
Public 6.46 6.44 6.50 8.37 0.3 28.8 
 (1.0) (0.9) (0.8) (1.4)   
Private 14.22 19.32 22.99 21.17 30.8 －7.9 
 (2.1) (2.5) (3.0) (3.6)   
Other Income 46.35 53.88 62.62 70.37 17.6 12.4 
 (7.0) (7.1) (8.1) (11.9)   
Households 1978 1978 1978 1978   
Note: The percentage share is in the parenthesis. 
 
Between 1995 and 1997, per capita total income increased by 8.4 percent every year 
on average, with 5.9 and 11.9 percent increased in wage and asset income, respectively.  
Further, wage and asset income constituted 70 and 19 percent, respectively, of the total 
income in 1997. During this period, public and private transfers also increased by 0.3 and 
30.8 percent, respectively but occupied only a small percentage of total income, i.e., 3.8 
percent in 1997. 
With the onset of the crisis, per capita total income fell by 23.8 percent between 1997 
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and 1998. The two major income categories which are wage and asset income dropped by 
24.4 and 42.2 percent respectively. Private transfers decreased by 7.9 percent while public 
transfers rose by 28.8 percent. They, however, occupied only a small share of the total 
income, 5 percent in 1998, for instance.3 Furthermore, the share of wage income also 
decreased from 72.8 percent in 1995 to 69.1 percent in 1998. 
 
2. Evolution of Per Capita Income Inequality 
 
Korea is generally cited as a country with rapid economic growth and low income 
inequality. There is also a general acceptance of the view that income distribution has further 
improved recently. In view of this, Table 5 shows per capita income inequality measures 
between 1995 and 1998. 
The first two measures - Gini coefficient and Theil index - are widely used in 
empirical work. The Gini coefficient, which is more sensitive to changes in the middle of the 
dis tribution, remained the same in both 1995 and 1996 but decreased to 0.42 in 1997. Then it 
increased again to 0.43 during the crisis. And the Theil index, which is extremely sensitive to 
changes in the upper and lower tails, increased from 0.34 in 1995 and 0.36 in 1998. The last 
two measures that are coefficients of variation (CV) of per capita household income and 
standard deviation (SD) of log of per capita household income increased during the crisis as 
well. 
The larger the values of these inequality measures are the more unequal the income 
distribution. In Table 5, it is shown that the income distribution became unequal by all 
inequality indices except the Gini coefficient between 1995 and 1996 but had been improved 
until 1997. The onset of the crisis in 1997, however, aggravated income inequality. 
The estimated Gini coefficient of per capita consumption shows different trend over 
the same period. Using the same data used in this paper, Kang (2001) shows that the Gini 
coefficient of per adult-equivalent expenditure decreased during the crisis. Cheong (2001) 
finds that the Gini coefficient for urban households of per capita consumption did not 
increase, while it increased in terms of per capita income during the crisis. Kakwani (2000) 
finds that the Gini coefficient of per capita welfare did not show significant trend of an 
increase or decrease during the crisis. Both Cheong (2001) and Kakwani (2000) used the 
HIES data.4 
Table 6 shows the per capita household income by decile. Between 1996 and 1997, the 
per capita income in bottom 20, 30, and top 10 percent deciles dropped but that of other 
groups increased. During the financial crisis, the per capita income of low-income group 
except the lowest 10 percent group dropped more than that of high-income group. For 
instance, the income of the poorest 20 percent decile dropped by 60 percent. 
 
3. 23 and 31 percent of households received transfers in 1997 and 1998, respectively. 18 and 22 percent of 
households received private transfers and 9 and 16 percent received public transfers in 1997 and 1998, 
respectively (Jimenez, Kang and Sawada (2001)).  
4. See Ahn (1997) for a review of historical trends of income distribution and data used in the estimation of income 
inequality in Korea.  
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Tables 5 and 6 suggest that the crisis in Korea led to a more unequal income 
distribution, indicating two key points. First, per capita income distribution remained 
constant between 1995 and 1996. Second, while the income distribution had been improving, 
it became more unequal than that of 1995 after the financial crisis hit the country. 
 
Table 5  Per Capita Income Inequality 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Gini Coefficients 0.4234 0.4234 0.4177 0.4313 
Theil Index 0.3362 0.3452 0.3184 0.3573 
CV 1.0440 1.0735 0.9895 1.1573 
SD (log) 0.8422 0.8424 0.8241 0.8749 
 
Table 6  Average Per Capita Income by Decile 
Percentile 
of Income 
1996 1997 1998 
% change 
96-97 
% change 
97-98 
10 122.07 131.24 89.82 7.5 31.6 
20 261.11 250.27 187.82 －4.2 －60.0 
30 358.62 362.46 262.72 －3.8 －27.5 
40 446.42 451.45 335.83 1.1 －25.6 
50 530.68 545.13 404.66 2.7 －25.8 
60 610.75 641.53 484.34 5.0 －24.5 
70 720.61 761.05 570.78 5.6 －25.0 
80 871.18 934.3 707.45 7.3 －24.3 
90 1178.26 1235.32 945.46 4.8 －23.5 
100 2519.91 2453.66 1930.91 －2.6 －21.3 
 
In addition to the results shown by Tables 5 and 6, transition matrices of Table 7 show 
how the per capita income of households changed over the period 1996-1998. Such ordinal 
ranking may be important for tracking the location and characteristics of a household group. 
Due to missing data, only 1,879 households in 1996-1997 and 1,897 households in 1997- 
1998 out of balanced 1,978 households are considered.  
Rows represent quintiles of the year t  and columns represent quintiles of the year 
( 1+t ). Each cell of each row and column represents the number of households. For example, 
row I in year t  represents the lowest quintile (the poorest 20 percent) while row V in year 
t  represents the highest quintile (the richest 20 percent). Households along the diagonal 
were those that remained in the same quintile over the period. 
In 1996-1997, 830 households (44.2 percent) remained in the same original quintiles, 
515 households (27.4 percent) moved to higher quintiles and the remaining 534 households 
(28.4 percent) moved to lower quintiles. While in 1997-1998, 778 households (41.0 percent) 
remained in their original quintiles, 594 households (31.3 percent) moved to higher quintiles 
and the remaining 525 households (27.7 percent) moved to lower quintiles. Based on these 
results, the number of households that moved to higher quintiles is larger in 1997-1998 than 
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in 1996-1997. 
 
Table 7  Transition Matrices of Per Capita Income: 1996-1998 
  1997 
I II III IV V Total
I 224 93 30 20 15 382
II 77 140 77 47 34 375
III 39 86 122 77 54 378
IV 19 46 99 142 68 374
1996 
V 14 15 48 91 202 370
 Total 373 380 376 377 373 1879
        
  1998 
  I II III IV V Total
I 224 99 26 18 15 382
II 72 138 94 55 21 380
III 31 66 120 100 62 379
IV 28 44 80 121 104 377
1997 
V 25 36 64 79 175 379
 Total 380 383 384 373 377 1897
 
 
III. Inequality Analysis by Factor Component  
 
In this section, a formal decomposition of inequality and a descriptive evidence of per 
capita income by factor component are provided.  
 
1. Inequality Decomposition by Factor Component 
 
Following Shorrocks (1982, 1983), the decomposition index of income distribution by 
factor component (SF) is calculated as follows:5  
 
,
cv
cv
m
m
SF iii
i
ii rs
s
r ==  
 
where ir  is the correlation between total income and factor income i , and is  and s  
reflect standard deviation of factor income i  and total income, respectively. im  and m  
 
5. Since this rule does not depend on the specific inequality index, the contributions assigned to different income 
components will be invariant to the choice of inequality measure. See Lerman and Yitzhaki (1989), Silber (1989) 
and Sastry and Kelkar (1994) for decomposition analysis of Gini index. 
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represent the mean of factor income i  and total income, respectively and icv  and cv  
indicate the coefficient of variation of factor income i  and total income, respectively. Note 
that the sum of contribution by all factor income components is 1. 
Table 8 shows the Gini coefficient of each income component and its estimated 
contribution to income inequality. Factor components with a positive SF value make a 
disequalizing contribution to inequality in total income and those with negative SF make an 
equalizing contribution. 
The Gini coefficients of all income components decreased from 1996 to 1997. The 
Gini coefficients for wage and asset income, however, increased during the crisis. For 
example, the Gini coefficient for wage income in 1997 was 0.38 but it increased to 0.41 in 
1998. Furthermore, the Gini coefficient of asset income was large relative to that of wage 
income, which is intuitively reasonable. The higher inequality of transfers looks reasonable 
because they might serve as social safety nets. The remaining issue is how transfers were 
well targeted, which will be investigated in detail in section IV.  
The SF values show the pattern of factor contributions across years. The dominant 
positive effect on income inequality is by the asset income, which account for approximately 
55 and 51 percent in 1996 and 1998, respectively. Next is by the wage income (roughly 30 
percent in 1997 and 28 percent in 1998), followed by the other income. Our major interest 
here is the effect of transfers on income inequality. To indicate that transfers acted as social 
safety nets they should be observed to have negative effect. The estimated SF value for 
private transfers show that private transfers helped in narrowing income inequality in 1996 
and 1998 but contributed in increasing income inequality in 1997. Although the impact was 
not large, private transfers thus acted as social safety nets. On the other hand, showing a 
positive SF value, public transfers did not contribute in decreasing income inequality. 
 
Table 8  Inequality Decomposition by Factor Income 
 Gini SF*100 
 1996 1997 1998 1996 1997 1998 
Wage Income 0.3785 0.3776 0.4084 32.13 30.32 28.00 
Asset Income 0.9161 0.9052 0.9222 54.48 51.46 51.60 
Private Transfers 0.9277 0.9264 0.9157 －0.22 1.43 －0.21 
Public Transfers 0.9772 0.9746 0.9713 0.31 0.05 0.25 
Other Income 0.9272 0.9218 0.9084 14.30 16.75 20.36 
Total 0.4234 0.4157 0.4313 100 100 100 
 
2. Descriptive Evidence 
 
Based on the findings above, the role of each income component needs to be further 
examined. Using per capita income decile, Tables 9 and 10 show the trends of wage and 
asset income changes, respectively. The wage income of poor group dropped more than that 
of high-income group. In 1996-1997, while the income of the poorest 30 percent and the 
richest 10 percent decreased, that of other group increased. During the financial crisis, on the 
other hand, the wage income of all income groups dropped. The wage income of the poorest 
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10 to 40 percent decreased, on average, by 30 percent while that of the richest 10 to 40 
percent decreased, on average, only by 21 percent. The crisis, therefore, increased wage 
income inequality as Table 8 shows. 
On the other hand, high-income group, compared with low-income group, experienced 
more loss in their asset income in 1998. For instance, the richest 30 percent, which gained 
asset income except the richest 10 percent part of it in 1997, lost almost half of their asset 
income in 1998. The percentage of asset income loss by low-income group was less than that 
of high-income group. 
 
Table 9  Average Per Capita Wage Income by Decile 
Percentile 
of Income 
1996 1997 1998 
% change 
96-97 
% change 
97-98 
10 84.85 77.61 52.85 －8.5 －31.9 
20 198.54 189.59 139.36 －4.5 －26.5 
30 318.07 309.4 213.36 －2.7 －31 
40 390.05 413.14 274.35 5.9 －33.6 
50 477.52 499.71 354.31 4.7 －29.1 
60 540.99 559.93 432.64 3.5 －22.7 
70 646.74 659.86 484.58 2 －26.6 
80 732.8 744.46 578.32 1.6 －22.3 
90 829.91 889.42 667.27 7.2 －25 
100 1047.09 948.8 869.36 －9.4 －8.4 
 
Table 10  Average Per Capita Asset Income by Decile 
Percentile 
of Income 
1996 1997 1998 
% change 
96-97 
% change 
97-98 
10 5.11 7.6 6.62 48.7 －12.9 
20 12.06 10.6 8.4 －12.1 －20.8 
30 10.84 17.02 12.88 57.0 －24.3 
40 16.48 11.21 16.74 －32.0 49.0 
50 20.43 12.68 14.76 －37.9 16.4 
60 32.23 29.85 17.91 －7.4 －40.0 
70 36.45 48.27 37.42 32.4 －22.5 
80 68.15 92.7 45.55 36.0 －50.9 
90 202.88 222.34 105.56 9.6 －52.5 
100 1015.33 966.85 554.91 －4.8 －42.6 
 
Table 11 also shows per capita other income increased for low-income and 
high-income groups and decreased for middle-income group during the crisis. Furthermore, 
the richest 10 percent occupied the largest percentage of the total other income. As defined in 
Table 3, other income was mostly constituted of financial securities.  
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Table 11  Average Per Capita Other Income 
Percentile 
of Income 
1996 1997 1998 
% change 
96-97 
% change 
97-98 
10 0.92 1.72 1.99 87 15.7 
20 1.82 3.34 4.32 83.5 29.3 
30 1.94 4.51 5.68 132.5 25.9 
40 8.26 6.11 8.57 －26 40.3 
50 10.48 14.18 13.49 36.3 －4.9 
60 15.54 30.99 17.66 99.4 －43 
70 27.54 34.53 23.54 25.4 －31.8 
80 53.4 75.15 63 40.7 －16.2 
90 120.62 95.63 133.27 －20.7 39.4 
100 265.11 292.61 399.73 10.4 36.6 
 
 
IV. Public Transfers as Social Safety Nets 
 
Two main theoretical points must be first made clear before further examining the role 
of transfers: first, why would one household give money or goods to another and second, 
what is the relation between private and public transfers. In regard to the former, two 
principal motives exist: altruism and exchange (Cox (1987)). Households transfer resources 
out of feelings of altruism that implicitly determines the recipient’s consumption (Becker 
(1974)). An alternative motivation is that households give resources in exchange for 
something such as future assistance in time of need. Donors give resources in order to 
receive something in exchange for their transfers in times of need (Bernheim, Shleifer, and 
Summers (1985)). 
Further understanding about private transfers is important for policy making because, 
among other things, these remittances provide social and economic benefits similar to those 
of public programs such as unemployment insurance, pension support, educational credit, 
and health insurance. As such, private transfers may supplement or overlap with public 
transfers, and, if private donors give less as public transfers increase, the effect of public 
programs on beneficiaries would be less than originally intended or the transfers may alter 
the distributional effect of public programs. Thus, the interlinkage between private and 
public transfers is important since nearly all public policies, including those that focus on the 
economy’s general performance, redistribute income from one group to another. 
The relation between private and public transfers is affected by the relative importance 
of the two motives of transfers discussed above. The altruism model predicts that public 
transfers tend to displace private transfers while the exchange model indicates that 
government transfers will have little effect on private ones (Becker (1974), Bernheim, 
Shleifer, and Summers (1985), Cox (1987)).6 Thus the mere existence of private transfers 
 
6. Cox and Jimenez (1995) estimate that if unemployment insurance system was introduced in the Philippines, 
 
KANG AND LEE: INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND PUBLIC TRANSFERS 
 71 
does not imply that crowding-out necessarily occurs.7 
If crowding-out occurs, it could pose difficult targeting problems for policy makers. 
For example, what happens when poor households who are already receiving private 
transfers are targeted for a public subsidy? The subsidy eases the burden of private donors, 
who will then contribute less to their relatives and friends. 8  Thus, in essence, the 
government subsidy indirectly benefits donors. As donors are often from upper-income 
brackets, some of the government subsidy intended only for the poor is diverted to better-off 
households. Thus government needs a careful targeting scheme to prevent such crowding-out 
effects. 
Based on theoretical considerations, one of the main concerns of this paper is the role 
of private and public transfers as social safety net devices during the financial crisis that is 
examined by investigating how much each decile group of per capita income received private 
or public transfers throughout the period. As Table 12 shows, the observed trend of public 
transfers is in contrast to our expectation. High-income group received more public transfers, 
compared with low-income group. For instance, the public transfers of the richest 10 to 30 
percent increased, on average, by 152 percent while that of the poorest 10 to 30 percent 
decreased, on average, by 34 percent in 1998. This suggests that the public transfers did not 
contribute in reducing the income inequality during the crisis. This is because of the fact that 
the public transfers are consisted predominantly of pension, and not of public assistance. 
This implies that the safety net programs were not yet in place during the initial period of the 
crisis. 
On the other hand, the private transfers in Table 13 shows an opposite trend. It is 
clearly shown that low-income group received relatively large amount of private transfers. 
For instance, in 1998, the poorest 40 percent received about 268 thousand Korean won on 
average whereas the richest 40 percent group received 187 thousand Korean won on average. 
The amount high-income group received is lower than that of low-income group except for 
the richest 10 percent group. This confirms that the inter-household private transfers play a 
positive role in reducing income gap, which is also shown in Table 8.9 
 
 
private transfers would fall so much that the intended beneficiaries of the program would scarcely be any better 
off. In contrast, they find that the degree of crowding-out associated with pensions is much less dramatic. If 
transfers are motivated by exchange, so that they compensate the recipient for providing the donor with some 
kind of service, government transfers will have little effect on private ones (Cox (1987)). 
7. Using the same data used in this paper, Jimenez, Kang and Sawada (2001) show a strong crowding-out relation 
between private and public transfers throughout the period. 
8. Existing evidence on the extent and magnitude of crowding-out is mixed (Cox and Jimenez (1990, 1995), 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994), Cox and Jakubson (1995), Cox, Eser and Jimenez (1998)). 
9. Using binary response panel model, Jimenez, Kang and Sawada (2001) show that pre-transfer income has a 
negative relation with the probability of receiving private transfers. This result suggests that private transfers in 
Korea were largely motivated by alt ruistic behavior implying that private transfers were well targeted to poor 
households. 
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Table 12  Average Per Capita Public Transfers by Decile 
Percentile 
of Income 
1996 1997 1998 
% change 
96-97 
% change 
97-98 
10 8.45 10.15 7.88 20.1 －22.4 
20 8.98 5.87 5.29 －34.6 －9.9 
30 6.10 7.48 2.39 22.6 －68.1 
40 5.66 5.01 8.17 －11.5  63.1 
50 4.89 4.00 4.41 －18.2  10.3 
60 3.62 9.55 4.81 163.8 －49.6 
70 1.79 5.14 6.55 187.2  27.4 
80 9.18 5.67 11.43 －38.2 101.6 
90 9.00 2.85 22.97 －68.3  70.6 
100 6.76 8.98 9.63 32.8   7.2 
 
Table 13  Average Per Capita Private Transfers by Decile 
Percentile 
of Income 
1996 1997 1998 
% change 
96-97 
% change 
97-98 
10 22.72 34.17 20.48 50.4  －40.1 
20 39.71 40.88 30.44  3.0 －100.0 
30 21.67 24.05 28.40  11.0   18.1 
40 25.97 15.99 28.00 －38.4   75.1 
50 17.35 14.57 17.69 －16.0   21.4 
60 18.37 11.21 11.33 －39.0     1.1 
70  8.09 13.25 18.69  63.8   41.1 
80  7.65 16.32  9.15 113.3  －43.9 
90 15.86 25.08 16.39  58.1  －34.7 
100 16.36 32.55 30.37  99.0   －6.7 
 
An exa mination of Table 14 indicates the role of each component of public transfers. 
The first three columns represent public transfers in terms of pensions: National is national 
pension, Civil servant is private schools, civil servants, or military pension, and Veterans is 
veterans’ pension. The fourth column, Insurance, is the transfer from employment insurances 
and the fifth column, Support, is the support from the government or social organizations. 
The last column shows the value of per capita public transfers, which is the same with the 
values shown in Table 12. 
High-income group received larger income from pensions. In addition, the support 
from the government or social organizations, as expected, played a positive role in reducing 
income inequality, except among the richest 10 percent, and was therefore an effective social 
safety net device. Public transfers from insurances, on the other hand, can be ignored since 
its amount is negligible. Based on the values presented, it can be said that most of the public 
transfers served as sources of extra income rather than as safety net devices. 
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As discussed in the introduction, Korean government was not well prepared in the 
beginning of the crisis. This is supported by the empirical results of this paper. After the 
crisis hit the country, the government, however, started to allocate larger budget into social 
safety nets. It responded to sharp increase in unemployment by putting forth a comprehensive 
unemployment benefit package in March 1998, which was agreed upon in the Tripatric 
Commission composed of businessmen, union leaders and public officials. The package 
includes an expanded unemployment insurance system, subsidized loan programs for the 
unemployed and venture businesses, active wage market policies, public work programs and 
others.10 The effect of these government social safety net programs is however not explored 
in this paper since the data used only covers from Aug. 1997 to Jun. 1998. It is therefore not 
fair to conclude that government programs had no contribution in recovering economic 
crisis. 
 
Table 14  Average Per Capita Public Transfers by Category and by Decile (1998) 
Percentile 
of Income 
National 
Civil 
Servant 
Veterans Insurance Support Total 
10 0.10 0.00 0.65 0.16 6.98 7.88 
20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.29 5.29 
30 0.08 0.00 0.77 0.00 1.54 2.39 
40 0.88 1.08 4.41 0.00 1.80 8.17 
50 0.61 0.23 2.82 0.00 0.75 4.41 
60 2.61 0.00 1.71 0.36 0.13 4.81 
70 1.62 3.17 1.19 0.00 0.57 6.55 
80 1.02 7.00 3.04 0.26 0.10 11.43 
90 0.08 9.66 8.92 0.00 4.32 22.97 
100 3.10 5.07 0.79 0.53 0.10 9.63 
Mean 1.03 2.64 2.42 0.13 2.14 8.37 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Using 5-year balanced household panel data, this paper shows that the burden of the 
economic crisis was not shared equally by the poor and the rich in Korea. All of the income  
inequality measures increased during the economic crisis, suggesting that the income 
inequality in the country had worsened. In order to explore the impact of different income 
sources on income inequality, this paper divided the total income into four categories: wage, 
 
10. For instance, in 1998, Korean government allocated a budget of 3,625 billion won, i.e., 1.3 percent of the GDP, 
for social safety net s and unemployment -related expenditures. As the recession deepened, the government 
further increased 1999 budget allocations for social programs by 34.3 percent compared to the previous year. 
Thus the consideration of data after the crisis might find a significant role of social safety net programs newly 
introduced by government (Moon, Lee and Yoo (1999)).  
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asset, transfers, and other income. The wage income of low-income group dropped more 
than that of high-income group. The asset income of high-income group, however, dropped 
more. The other income of low-income group increased but that of high-income group 
decreased.  
What is more interesting is the distributional effect of transfers. Although private 
transfers were effective social safety net devices, public transfers were not and did not 
contribute in improving income inequality. This is because public transfers are consisted 
predominantly of pension and not of public assistance, and because social safety net 
programs were not yet in place in the initial period of the crisis.  
After the onset of the crisis, however, the government expanded its social safety net 
programs as discussed in section IV. With these ongoing policies, the World Bank (2000) 
indicates that the negative impact of the crisis on households’ welfare was smaller than was 
originally expected because the sensible responses of households and the government played 
an important role in combating the crisis. The KHPS data used in this paper, however, does 
not cover the effect of government policies implemented just after the crisis. Hence, the 
impact of these policies on income distribution might not have been reflected in the analysis. 
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